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I. REPLY
INTRODUCTION
THE COMMISSION LACKED AUTHORITY TO LOWER ALPINE SCHOOL
DISTRICT'S PROPERLY ADOPTED RATE.
The Commission fails to meet the key issue before this court: whether the
Commission exceeded its authority in lowering Alpine School District's adopted tax
rate.1 The Commission mistakenly assumes that the dispute hinges on its authority over
the certified tax rate. However, the certified tax rate and Alpine School District's
adopted tax rate are two statutorily different rates. The Commission attempts to divert
attention from its lack of authority to change adopted tax rates by recharacterizing its
actions as a rate correction to the certified tax rate instead of a reduction to a properly
adopted tax rate. However, this matter does not involve a simple a tax rate correction,
but rather involves an unauthorized reduction to Alpine School District's lawfully
adopted tax. An analysis of the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions
demonstrates that once Alpine School District had lawfully adopted its tax rate in excess
of the certified tax rate and within the maximum levy permitted by law, the Commission
lacked authority to lower the adopted tax rate.
In addition, the Commission attempts to obfuscate the issue by pointing to the
change to its motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue estimates. Again, this bypasses the real

!

The Commission continues to refer to Alpine School District's tax rate in excess
of the certified tax rate as the "proposed tax rate" when pursuant to the statutory
framework it should properly be referred to as Alpine School District's "adopted tax
rate." {See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-912, 59-2-919.)
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issue. This matter arises out of and is centered on Alpine School District's adopted ad
valorem tax rate. Although the Commission's estimates of motor vehicle fee-in-lieu
revenue are relevant to the Commission's establishment of the "certified tax rate," the
Commission's motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue estimates—and any adjustment to the
certified rate—have no bearing or relationship to Alpine School District's adopted tax rate
in excess of the certified tax rate. Indeed, the statutory framework clearly limits any
adjustment to any tax rate based on the Commission's motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue
to only the certified tax rate. However, the statutory framework expressly provides that a
taxing entity like Alpine School District is not bound to the certified tax rate, providing
the means by which the taxing entity can exceed the certified tax when in setting its ad
valorem property tax rate. Consequently, the Commission's extended reliance on its own
untimely, altered motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue estimates as the basis for its action in
reducing Alpine School District's adopted tax rate is misplaced. The issue is not what
amount of fee-in-lieu revenue from motor vehicles Alpine School District would
ultimately receive, but whether Alpine School District adopted a rate for ad valorem
property tax in excess of the certified tax rate.

A.

PROPER STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DEMONSTRATES THAT
THE COMMISSION HAS NO AUTHORITY TO LOWER ALPINE
SCHOOL DISTRICT'S ADOPTED TAX RATE.
1.

The Commission Cannot Effectively Respond to the Plain and
Unambiguous Statutory Language Which Demonstrates That the
Commission Exceeded its Authority.

Proper principles of statutory construction and interpretation demonstrate that the
Commission exceeded its authority in reducing Alpine's adopted rate. The
Commission's claim that Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g) independently grants it
authority to reduce Alpine's adopted rate misreads the plain language of the statute. That
language itself evidences only the intent to grant the Commission authority to adjust the
certified tax rate. Rather than recognizing that the plain statutory language offers no
valid basis for its action, the Commission erroneously injects the claim that it acted to
effect the legislative intent. The Commission would thus substitute its own interpretation
of intent which is in contravention to the language of the statutes. This legislative intent
argument, however, fails to account for the basic tenet that "The best indicator of
[legislative] intent is the plain language of the statute." Beaver County v. Utah State Tax
Comm 'w, 916 P.2d 344, 358 (Utah 1996). In fact, the plain language of Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-2-924(2)(g) allows the Commission to adjust only the certified tax rate, which is a
statutorily defined term. Though the Commission erroneously attempts to construe its
action as simply lowering the certified tax rate, the Commission did not simply lower
certified tax rates but rather lowered Alpine School District's adopted tax rate.
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g) provides:
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For the calendar year beginning on January 1, 1999, and
ending on December 31, 1999, a taxing entity's certified
tax rate shall be adjusted by the amount necessary to offset
the adjustment in revenues from uniform fees on tangible
personal property under Section 59-2-405.1 as a result of the
adjustment in uniform fees on tangible personal property
under Section 59-2-405.1 enacted by the Legislature during
the 1998 Annual General Session.
Despite the clarity of the limited grant of authority provided by the legislature in this
subsection, the Commission simply disregards the plain language of the statute, claiming
that Section 924(2)(g) provides a broad and expansive grant of authority under which it
is authorized to change Alpine School District's adopted rate.
In addition, the Commission ignores the context in which Utah Code Ann. § 59-2924(2)(g) is found. Subsection 924(2)(g) is a subset of the statute which deals only with
the certified tax rate. Had the legislature desired to grant broad authority to change rates
in addition to the "certified tax rate" as asserted by the Commission, it certainly would
not have limited the grant by only using the defined term "certified tax rate." The Utah
Supreme Court has held:
This court looks first to the plain language of a statute when
deciding questions of statutory interpretation and assumes
that each term was used advisedly by the legislature.
Similarly, statutory construction presumes that the expression
of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of another.
Therefore, omissions in statutory language should "be taken
note of and given effect."
Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,\\4, 993 P.2d 875 (citations omitted).
Further, in construing a statute, a court must assume that "each term in the statute
was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is

unreasonably confused or inoperable." County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v.
Utah State Tax Comm 7z, 944 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). Had the
legislature desired to empower the Commission to lower a taxing entity's adopted rate, it
could have expressly done so. The absence of any such grant of authority or any
reference to such notion in the statute itself demonstrates that the grant of authority is
limited and that the Commission inappropriately acted beyond its authority.
2.

The Commission Erroneously Attempts to Inject its Own
Interpretation of the Legislative Intent.

Rather than looking to the statutory language, the Commission seeks instead to
rely on selected statements made by two legislators. (Respondent's Brief at 11, 14.)
Although neither legislative actually supports the Commission's overly broad
interpretation of the statute, the Commission's reference to the statements is nevertheless
unwarranted. Because the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, any reference to
legislative history is unnecessary and inappropriate. Of interest is the position advanced
by the Commission in the case of Visitor Information Center Authority of Grand County
v. Customer Service Division, Utah State Tax Comm yn, 930 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1997).
The Commission urged the Utah Supreme Court to agreed with its position that "that the
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and, thus, any inquiry into legislative
history would be improper." Id. at 1197. The court held:
Unless the statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find
no need to delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history.
"When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to
mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction."
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Id at 1198 {citing Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d
1017, 1020 (Utah 1995)); accord State v. Valdez, 933 P.2d 400, 401 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) ("[0]nly if the plain language of the statute is unclear do we 'resort to legislative
history and purpose for guidance.'" (citation omitted)). It is understandable that the
Commission wants no part of this holding in the case at bar. Because the statutory
language is clear, "both the legislative history and statements made by Senator[s] must
yield to the clear and unmistakable language of the statute." C T ex rel Taylor v.
Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ^13, 977 P.2d 479.
Thus, the Commission's repeated references to the assumed intent that the
commission adjust all tax rates to avoid "windfalls" is based entirely on two comments
made by the legislatures, and has no basis in the statute itself. In any case, any
statutory intent that the Commission adjust tax rates to prevent windfalls would be
further limited by the statute's plain language to the context of establishing the certified
tax rate.

B.

ONCE ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT ADOPTED ITS TAX RATE IN
EXCESS OF THE CERTIFIED TAX RATE, THE COMMISSION HAD NO
AUTHORITY TO CHANGE THAT ADOPTED TAX RATE.
1.

The Statutory Framework Allows a Taxing Entity like Alpine District
to Adopt a Rate Which Exceeds the Certified Tax Rate.

The Commission correctly states that "A taxing entity is permitted to annually
issue a levy for ad valorem property tax upon the property located within its jurisdiction."
(Respondent's Brief at 8-9.) However, the Commission's next statement that "This levy

is limited by law to the 'certified rate.'" (Respondent's Brief at 9), is misleading and
incorrect. The Commission actually admits that the that the levy is not limited to the
"certified tax rate," stating, "A taxing entity is prohibited from budgeting ad valorem
revenue in excess of the revenue allowed under the certified rate unless it properly
completes the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-918 and 919." (Respondent's
Brief at 9.) The statutory scheme provides that the taxing entity may exceed the certified
tax rate once it satisfies certain procedural and public notice requirements known as a
"truth in taxation" hearing.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(G) Does Not Support the Commission's
Action, Despite the Commission's Reliance upon It.

While the plain statutory language allows the Commission to adjust the certified
tax rate, it does not allow the Commission to subsequently change the adopted rate of
Alpine School District. The Commission makes the unsupported logical leap that
"Because the Commission was required to adjust Alpine's certified rates, it was also
required to adjust the proposed rates." (Respondent's Brief at 12.) The certified tax rate
and Alpine's adopted rate are two separately defined terms.
"[W]ords and phrases used in a statute, if also defined by statute, must be
construed according to that definition." Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, 905
P.2d 867, 871 (Utah 1995). "Certified tax rate" is statutorily defined as follows: "The
'certified tax rate' means a tax rate that will provide the same ad valorem property tax
revenues for a taxing entity as were collected by that taxing entity for the prior year."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(a)(i). The term "Adopted tax rate" is specifically

referenced in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924, and means "a tax rate in excess of the certified
tax rate" adopted by resolution. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919. Once Alpine School
District adopts a rate in excess of the certified tax rate pursuant to the requirements of
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919, any reference to the "certified tax rate" becomes irrelevant
because the proper term as used in the statutory framework is the "adopted tax rate."
Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g), the Commission asserts that
"Because the Commission had authority to reduce Alpine's certified rate, the
Commission also had authority to reduce Alpine's proposed rate in order to give effect to
the plain language of the statute and its legislative intent." (Respondent's Brief at 6).
However, this statement is internally inconsistent. It is simply fallacious to assume that
because the Commission is authorized at the outset to make an adjustment to the certified
tax rate based on its estimates for motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue, the Commission is
also authorized to subsequently adjust a taxing entity's adopted rate. Alpine School
District's adopted rate has no direct relation to the certified rate nor to the Commission's
estimates of motor vehicle fee-in-lieu revenue. The Commission simply ignores the
statutory framework, characterizing Alpine School District's statutorily defined approved
rate as merely a "proposed rate." The Commission's reasoning ignores the legislature's
express authorization to taxing entities such as Alpine School District to adopt a different
rate which exceeds the certified tax rate.
The Commission's argument makes certain assumptions which are simply
incorrect. The Commission assumes that Alpine arrives at its proposed and adopted rate

primarily based on the certified rate and that the adopted rate remains dependent upon the
certified rate, asserting that "Because the certified rate is the key component of the
proposed rate, lowering one necessarily involves lowering the other in order to give the
statute effect." (Respondent's Brief at 13.) This is simply wrong. Again, the adopted
rate is independent from the certified rate. When Alpine determines that the certified rate
is insufficient, Alpine has the statutory option to exceed the certified rate to establish the
ad valorem rate it deems necessary, provided it does not exceed the maximum levy set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 53-2-908. Thus, in arriving at the adopted rate, the central
issue is what ad valorem tax rate Alpine School District desires to set, a determination
which includes rate-setting considerations essential in order to receive guaranteed or
additional funds apart from the funds raised directly from the ad valorem tax. (R. 71 at
pp. 8-9.) The key consideration is not simply the certified rate. The fact that the certified
tax rate may be subsequently lowered or increased does not alter the fact that the ad
valorem tax rate adopted by Alpine School District is no longer dependent upon or
related to the certified tax rate. The Commission's Brief ignores the evidence presented
to the Commission below that Alpine School District set its budget and ad valorem tax
rate independently, based on its own estimates. (R. 71 at pp. 8-9.)
In addition, the Commission's reasoning erroneously assumes that District is privy
to the Commission's fee-in-lieu estimates. This assumption is simply contrary to all the
evidence presented below. (R. 71 at pp. 8-9.) Because Alpine School District is left to
rely on its own estimates, it is essential that Alpine School District be able to set its

_o_

budget based those estimates. The Commission's fee-in-lieu estimates are only relevant
for purposes of the Commission's determination of the certified tax rate. Fee-in-lieu
estimates are not relevant to Alpine School District's adopted rate.
Also inherent in the Commission's argument is the flawed notion that the
individual taxing entity is precluded from making its own estimates of tax revenue.2 This
assumes that the individual taxing entity must be bound by the estimates generated by
the Commission. However, if such were the case, the legislature would not have
provided the individual taxing entity with the ability to exceed the certified tax rate. In
fact, an individual taxing entity is empowered to determine its budgetary needs, set a
budget, and determine the amount of ad valorem taxes it will levy.
3.

Alpine School District Satisfied the Requirements of Truth in Taxation
in Adopting its Tax Rate.

After a local taxing entity like Alpine School District has gone through the truth in
taxation proceedings, a taxing entity can exceed the certified tax rate as long as it does
not exceed the maximum levy allowed by law. In other words, once truth in taxation
proceedings are satisfied, an adopted tax rate cannot be changed by the Commission
unless the adopted tax rate exceeds the maximum levy allowed by law. Apparently

2

In footnote 2 of its Brief, the Commission raises an issue which is entirely beside
the point, stating that Alpine's necessary practice of having to make its own estimates of
fee-in-lieu revenue is "in conflict and do[es] not square with the plain meaning of Utah
Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g) which places with the Commission the authority and
obligation to estimate fee-in-lieu revenue." Alpine School District has never asserted
that its fee-in-lieu estimates should be used as official estimates in establishing the
certified rate. It is disingenuous to assert that the statute somehow prevents taxing
entities from making their own estimates for their own uses.

recognizing the weakness of its position in light of its tacit acknowledgment that it
cannot change a properly adopted tax rate, the Commission now attempts to raises the
argument, contrary to its own findings, that Alpine did not comply with the requirements
of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919. However, the Commission not only waived the
argument below but in fact and made findings not merely inconsistent with but flatly
contrary to the position it now espouses.
Despite its own findings to the contrary, the Commission now would claim that
"Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-914, the Commission had authority to lower Alpine's
rate because it violated the maximum levy permitted by law when it presented incorrect
information to the taxpayers under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919." (Respondent's Brief at
17.) The Commission's own findings from the outset have been that Alpine School
District lawfully complied with all the requirements to increase its tax rate above the
certified tax rate as prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919. The original ruling of
October 12 provided that "Alpine properly completed the statutory tax increase
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919 that were necessary for it to levy its proposed
property tax increase." (R. 57.) (emphasis added.) In its final ruling, the Commission
again found compliance, conceding that it could not lower Alpine's adopted [proposed]
rate based on Section 919 when it ruled that "Section 59-2-919 does not allow a taxing
entity to levy a tax rate higher than its certified tax rate unless the procedures found in
that section are satisfied. Nebo and Alpine did complete those procedures, so neither

Nebo's nor Alpine's proposed tax rate could be lowered just because its proposed tax
rate exceeded its recalculated certified tax rate." (R. 33.) (emphasis added.)
"Instead, the Division lowered Nebo's and Alpine's proposed tax rates to satisfy
the provisions of subsection 59-2-924(2)(g)." (R. 33.) Thus, as stated by the
Commission, the Commission based its decision for lowering Alpine School District's
adopted rate on Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g) because it could not rely on Utah
Code Ann. §59-2-919.
Any assertion of noncompliance with Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-919 also ignores the
fact that the Commission's untimely actions precluded Alpine School District from
holding subsequent truth-in-taxation proceedings.3 The Commission's interpretation
would impose upon Alpine School District the obligation to hold multiple truth in
taxation hearings anytime the Commission adjusted the certified tax rate, despite having
inadequate time under the statutory framework to do so. Previously the Commission

3

Alpine School District was hindered because throughout the entire process, the
Commission failed to provide information by the dates prescribed by the. As evidenced
by the deadlines provided for in the statutes by the legislature, the legislature intended
that the Commission provide accurate and timely certified tax rates to the individual
taxing entities. However, the Commission failed to provide Alpine with the certified tax
rate before June 1 as prescribed in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(1). At best, it is an
understatement for the Commission to say that "The legislature probably thought the
certified rates would be lowered before any proposed rates were submitted."
(Respondent's Brief at 13.) In fact, in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(1), the legislature
expressly instructs that certified rates are to be provided by June 1. However, the
Commission failed to provide Alpine with the certified tax rate before June 1. as
prescribed. The intent as evidenced by the inclusion of deadlines in the statutes is that
certified rate would be provided in timely manner so that a taxing entity like Alpine
School District could exceed the certified tax rate and adopt the ad valorem tax rate it
deemed necessary.

recognized this, noting, that "by the time the Division recalculated the certified tax rates,
most of the steps associated with the final tax rate setting processes had already occurred,
including the proposal of tax rates by the taxing entities, the receipt of the subsection 592-919(4) notices of valuation by all taxpayers, and the completion of the publication and
hearing requirements by those taxing entities proposing tax increases." (R. 32-32.) If the
Commission sought to justify its adjustment of the adopted rate with any deficiency in
Alpine School District's truth in taxation compliance, it should have informed Alpine so
that Alpine could have again availed itself of the procedural requirements for truth in
taxation set forth in Section 919. At the hearing before the Commission, Alpine School
District specifically raised this point:
even if it were to determined that the Commission does have
authority to reduce an entity's proposed tax rate because of a
revised certified tax rate, then the entity should be given the
same opportunity it had with the original certified tax rate.
That is, to review those rates to determine if they want to
exceed the certified tax rate, and then should be given the
same opportunity to go through the notice procedure, the
truth in taxation procedure.
Now, in this situation it seems a little ridiculous to do that
because if we were to go through that process, we're going
back and telling our constituents there that we're having
another truth in taxation hearing; however, your taxes are not
going to go up any higher than they did in the last meeting. It
will be exactly the same as in the last meeting, the only
difference being that the certified tax rate has changed.
(R. at 71 pp. 9-10.)
Further, at the time Alpine provided its notices and held its hearings, the
information provided to the public was correct. The essential purpose of the truth in
_n_

taxation provisions is to inform taxpayers of the ad valorem tax rate and amount of their
ad valorem tax. It is to give notice of what tax they will be paying. Taxpayers were in
fact informed what the actual tax would be. Alpine School District complied by
informing its taxpayers the amount of ad valorem tax which Alpine School District
would collect. Inherent in the notice process are safeguards against windfalls as
concerned citizens are able to assess the information.
C

THE COMMISSION DOES NOT HAVE A BROAD GRANT OF
DISCRETION TO IGNORE THAT UNDER THE STATUTORY
FRAMEWORK, IT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO LOWER THE ADOPTED
RATE,
The Commission further seeks to justify the substitution of its own statutory

interpretation by asserting that it has acted within an explicit grant of discretion to
interpret the statute. In support, the Commission points to the introductory phrase of
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-914(l)(a) which states: "If the commission determines that a levy
established for a taxing entity set under Section 59-2-913 is in excess of the maximum
levy permitted by law, the commission shall: (a) lower the levy so that it is set at the
maximum level permitted by law . . . ." This is not an explicit grant of discretion to
construe the meaning of the statute, however. This plainly does not grant the
Commission the discretion to define "the maximum level permitted by law." That term,
like others, is defined in the statutes. Specifically, the "maximum levy permitted by law'5
is statutorily defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-908 which is entitled "Single aggregate
limitation-Maximum levy."

Thus, any grant of discretion to the Commission in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2914(l)(a) is not general, but is limited to the determination of whether Alpine's adopted
rate exceed the maximum levy level set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-908. The
Commission made no finding that Alpine's adopted rate exceed the maximum levy as
provided for in § 59-2-908, and no further deference is granted to the Commission.
(Even if the Commission were granted the discretion it claims, its Ruling fails even under
a reasonableness standard of review.) Certainly, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-914(l)(a) does
not grant the Commission discretion to broadly disregard the plain language of Utah
Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g). Once Alpine School District adopted its proposed rate, the
certified tax rate and adopted rate are not linked except to the extent the certified tax rate
might be the maximum levy permitted by law as prescribed by 59-2-908. However, the
Commission has never asserted that in this case the certified tax rate is the maximum.
Nothing in the statutory framework directly links the adopted rate to the certified rate.
As a result, subsequent changes made by the Commission to the certified rate do not
affect the validity of Alpine School District's adopted rate.
The Commission also alludes to its constitutional authorization to oversee the
state's taxation. However, this general authority to administer and supervise the tax laws
of the state does not allow the Commission to defy plain statutory language enacted by
the Legislature. The Commission's action in contravention to the plain meaning of the
statutory framework cannot be justified by its role as overseer of taxes.
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II. CONCLUSION
The Commission exceeded its authority in ordering that Alpine School District's
adopted tax rate be reduced. Proper statutory construction of the relevant statutes leads
directly to the conclusion that the statutes do not authorize this action. Alpine School
District lawfully complied with all the requirements to impose a tax rate exceeding the
certified tax rate, and that adopted rate therefore did not exceed the maximum levy
permitted by law. The Commission erroneously lowered Alpine School District's
adopted tax rate, in reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-924(2)(g). Because the District's
adopted rate was approved in compliance with truth in taxation requirements, and
exceeded the certified rate, the Commission's lowering of the certified rate based on its
changed estimates of fee-in-lieu revenues is irrelevant to the validity of the District's
adopted rate and cannot provide a basis for altering the adopted rate.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25 TH day of August 2000.

BURBIDGE, CARNAHAN, OSTLER & WHITE

/

Brinton R. Burbiage/
Paul D. Van Komen
Attorneys for Petitioner
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I hereby certify that on the 2 5 T H day of August 2000,1 caused to be served by
the method indicated below a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing BRIEF
OF PETITIONER to the following:

>T

VIA FACSIMILE
VIA HAND DELIVERY
VIA U.S. MAIL
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Timothy A. Bodily
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 140874
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-0874
Counsel for Respondent
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